Title: The meaning of the latest "Regulations on Military Political Work" of the Communist Party of China in 2021

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Text:

1. News highlights The Communist Party of China recently issued the latest revision of the "Regulations on Military Political Work" (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations"). It has been 10 years since the last revision. This legal adjustment related to the CCP’s political army building and the party’s leadership has once again attracted the attention and research of various countries. Since the "Interim Regulations (Draft) on the Political Work of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" was formulated and promulgated in 1930, the Political Work Regulations have always been the basis for the military's political work. They have been revised 12 times, with a total of 10 chapters and 74 articles. Political work is called the lifeline of the People's Liberation Army. It performs ideological, political, and organizational work, and is also responsible for the task of forging the soul of the military. [1] The following is a study and analysis of the meaning of the latest "Regulations on Military Political Work" of the Communist Party of China.

2. Security Implications

The political work of the Chinese Communist Party’s military was founded in 1927 to imitate the Soviet Red Army. Mao Zedong formulated the system of division of labor among chiefs under the unified collective leadership of the party committee, which was the "Three Bay Adaptation" and became the beginning of the party's absolute leadership over the military. [2] In 1929, the Communist Party of China held the "Gutian Conference" to establish the relationship between the party and the army. Based on the principle of "building the party ideologically and building the army politically", it established the basic principles and systems for the party's leadership of the army and strengthened the party's centralized and unified leadership over the army. After the Gutian Conference, the "Political Work Program" and the "Regulations on Political Work of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" were promulgated, which promoted the institutionalization of political work and established the principle of "the party commands the gun", making political work the lifeline of the People's Liberation Army. [3] In 1930, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated the "Interim Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Draft)". This was the first "Political Work Regulations" of the CCP, which standardized its political work. [4]

The People’s Liberation Army of the Communist Party of China must be under the absolute leadership of the Party, and the highest command power belongs to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission; a political commissar is established in the units above the regiment level, and the military chief at the same level is the head of the unit, forming two chiefs Co-management. The political work of the Communist Party of China focuses on tasks such as party building, organizational work, political education, military manpower support management, and military propaganda. It constitutes an important factor in the combat effectiveness of the People's Liberation Army and is a fundamental guarantee for the party's absolute leadership over the military and the military's performance of its functions and missions. [5] It can be seen that the CCP’s political work can effectively implement the party’s mission and simultaneously grasp all the movements of the People’s Liberation Army to respond to the rapidly changing situation. The promulgation of the "Regulations" this time is mainly in response to military reforms, which can be divided into the following three points:

1. The People's Liberation Army's reform system and corruption rectification actions to achieve the goal of strengthening the military.

From the perspective of national defense strategy, in 2016 the People's Liberation Army of the Communist Party of China has completed "Deepen the reform of national defense and the military" and build a combat command system of "Central Military Commission - Theater - Troops", changing the Central Military Commission from 4 headquarters to 15 functional departments, and reorganizing 7 military regions into 5 theaters, forming " The reform of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the main battle zone, and the main service construction" has made the functional departments of the Military Commission, theater command institutions and service management agencies above the neck level, as well as military-level units below the neck level and the brigade, camp and company levels under the new system, the military organizational structure and The force system has been significantly reshaped, forming a flat command and accelerating the People's Liberation Army's maneuverability and flexible application space. [6] At the same time, the CCP internally promotes anti-corruption actions, investigates and punishes those who violate disciplines and laws, and improves military discipline to maintain the stability of the regime. [7] After five years of military reforms, the original "Regulations" were adjusted and the design and normative revisions were made from the regulatory level in an attempt to keep pace with the times and update the content according to the needs of the times to enhance the effectiveness of the PLA's joint operations.

2. Focus on preparing for war and improving combat capabilities.

From the perspective of military strategy, Xi Jinping once pointed out: "To be able to fight and win wars, the goal is to always be able to call upon them, be able to fight when they come, and win the war." [8] "Regulations" The party's direction is the direction of the PLA's political work. The central tasks of the party and the army determine the basic tasks of political work. It is particularly emphasized that political work must focus on preparing for war as the main task, and insist on playing a service guarantee role around the central tasks of the party and the army. In addition, the principles and requirements for organizing and carrying out political work during combat are proposed to ensure the organic integration and linkage of political work during combat and combat operations, and to improve the quality and efficiency of wartime political work. [9] In 2016, the CCP divided the original general political department into three departments, establishing the "Political Work Department of the Military Commission", the "Discipline Inspection Committee of the Military Commission" and the "Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Military Commission". At the same time, some functions of political work were divided into Achieving the goal of "Military Commission General Administration" includes adjusting the Military Commission headquarters structure and implementing a multi-departmental Military Commission system to consolidate the power of the Central Military Commission. [10] In addition, after the reform, the functions of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, which was originally responsible for the "public affairs, procuratorate, and law", were transformed into a "staff service organization", replacing the original "leading organization" and making the functions Toward areas such as party building, organizational work, and political education.

In addition, the units responsible for the implementation of the "Three War Wars" have also been adjusted. In the past, the units managed by the General Political Department of the "Three War Wars" were transferred to specialized departments with division of labor.[11] The units responsible for the "Three War Wars" were transformed into professional and Informatization, in order to achieve the goals of military reform and strengthen the People's Liberation Army's joint command and combat capabilities, can it maximize the effectiveness of the "three wars", as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Changes in responsible units before and after the military reform of the "Three Wars of the Communist Party of China"

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **time**  **tactics** | **Execution unit before military reform** | **Implementation unit after military reform** | **difference** |
| **psychological warfare** | **Liaison Department of the General Political Department** | **Strategic Support Force ( Unit 311 )** | **different** |
| **War of public opinion** | **Propaganda Department of the General Political Department** | **Internet Public Opinion Bureau ( newly added ) and Propaganda Bureau ( responsible by the Political Work Department )** | **same** |
| **legal battle** | **General Political Department Military Court** | **Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Military Commission ( newly added )** | **different** |

3. Consolidating Xi Jinping's power by seizing military power. Xi Jinping took over as the leader of the 18th National Congress in 2012.

In order to consolidate his position, he actively promoted "anti-corruption", eradicated all dissidents one by one, and created the "Xi Family Army". [12] In order to effectively and reliably control the real power of the People’s Liberation Army, the leader of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, emphasized in the latest Regulations the implementation of Xi Jinping’s thoughts on strengthening the military, insisted on the party’s absolute leadership over the People’s Liberation Army, implemented the “Chairman of the Military Commission Responsibility System”, and institutionally clarified the Central Military Commission Responsible for party work and political work in the military reflects the practical need for the Central Military Commission to fulfill its responsibilities of managing and governing the party after the reform of the military, so as to consolidate its role as the lifeline of political work. In addition, the review of the "Regulations" focuses on strengthening the party's leadership over the military's political work, and fully promotes the military to strengthen the "four consciousnesses", strengthen the "four self-confidences", and achieve "two maintenances" to achieve the goal of strengthening the military in the new era. [13] Therefore, it can be found that the revised "Regulations" continuously strengthen the party's leadership over the political work of the People's Liberation Army, and the party leads the party to ensure that it controls the military operations in all aspects. [14]

Based on the above, Xi Jinping revised the "Regulations" to implement the rule of law for the political work after the military reform, control the operation of the military through political work, and strengthen the party's leadership over the military, so as to achieve "the party commands the gun." Its main purpose is to consolidate Xi Jinping's power as a weapon and to control military power.

Reference, trend analysis and judgment

1. One of the 20 major layout tools

This article determines that the revision of the "Regulations" is one of Xi Jinping's 20 major layout tools. Use ideological education, laws and regulations, administrative management and other means to comprehensively manage the People's Liberation Army so that it can continue to maintain its leadership position. However, due to this impact on the original "succession echelon model" within the CCP, in order to avoid political Due to the changes in the situation, it is predicted that Xi Jinping will not easily step down as chairman of the Central Military Commission no matter what, and will continue to control military power and control all resources. This point can also be confirmed by the new "Internet Public Opinion Bureau" [15] established by the CCP. It is predicted that the CCP will continue to strengthen the control of internal and external network information, use the legal network as the party's mouthpiece, and effectively control the PLA's network. trends and the right to speak externally to control public opinion.

2. The People's Liberation Army is focusing more on military modernization and joint operations. The CCP's "Regulations" have "changed and remained unchanged". What has changed is: "added and strengthened joint operations capabilities, focused on preparing for war, and adjusted professional division of labor. Everything is based on being able to fight and win wars." as the goal to ensure the centenary of the founding of the army in 2027 and the modernization of the army in 2035." What remains unchanged is: the principle of "the party commands the gun" never allows the gun to command the party, nor can it achieve the nationalization of the military. Therefore, the People's Liberation Army can be said to be a party army, controlled by the Communist Party (led by Xi Jinping). In addition, the expansion of the CCP’s military power in the post-epidemic era is also worthy of our attention. The People’s Liberation Army has intensively strengthened its military construction, adopted a series of formulation or revision of laws and regulations, built a complete military and political system, and moved towards running the army in accordance with the law and strengthening the army in accordance with the law, so that the People’s Liberation Army Flatten the command, launch mobilization and general warfare in the shortest possible time, and continuously verify the actual combat effectiveness through military exercises, significantly improve the combat effectiveness of the People's Liberation Army, and move towards the goal of "Dream of a Strong Army" and "Dream of a Strong Nation", such as the 2020 "Joint Operations" "Outline (Trial)" to improve and strengthen war preparedness capabilities; the 2021 "National Defense Law" adds new development interests; the 2021 "Coast Police Law" adds new uses of weapons, etc. It can be seen from this that the CCP’s active military modernization layout has aroused doubts and worries in neighboring countries and other countries around the world, especially cross-strait relations, disputes over the waters surrounding Diaoyutai, and various islands and reefs in the South China Sea, etc., adding more variables to East Asia’s regional security.

Sources:

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